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LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS 
All parties to the proceeding in the trial court are identified in the caption on appeal, 
except that Janalyn Alder (now known as Janalyn Groscost) was initially named as a 
Defendant in the case, but was ordered dismissed prior to trial. 
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JURISDICTIONAL 
Jurisdiction of this matter in this court, is proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)(k). Jurisdiction of this matter prior to its transfer from the Utah Supreme Court was 
proper pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
To the extent that Appellee's Issues Presented for Review differ from the Appellant's 
issues, the following issue is presented for review: 
Did the trial court err in awarding Plaintiff the reasonable value of the benefit 
conferred upon Defendant? 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW: 
The theories on the applicable measure of damages on Plaintiffs unjust enrichment 
claim were argued to the trial court prior to the trial court's ruling. (R. 608, 609, 642 & 643). 
The trial court's determination regarding the applicable measure of damages is a question of 
law reviewed for correctness by the appellate court. Bailey-Allen Co., v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 
424 (Utah App. 1994). Moreover, the appellate court may affirm the trial court's decision on 
any proper ground. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of Case 
Plaintiff-Appellee Groscost filed an action against Defendant-Appellant Alder for 
damages arising out of the construction of a home. Groscost claimed damages under several 
theories of recovery, including unjust enrichment. Alder contends he is not obligated to 
Groscost in any fashion. 
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Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Groscost sued Alder for damages on several legal theories, including unjust 
enrichment, arising out of the construction of a home. (R. 60-66). Alder answered the 
lawsuit and stated he owed nothing to Groscost and also counter-claimed against Groscost for 
improper placement of a lien on the constructed home. (R. 70-75). 
All claims and causes of action were tried at a bench trial before the Honorable 
Kenneth Rigtrup, on November 9 and 10, 1994, and December 13, 1994. (R. 151-152). At 
the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that there was no meeting of the minds and 
therefore, no in law agreement existed between the parties. Accordingly, the trial court 
implied an agreement between the parties on the theory of unjust enrichment. The trial 
court found that: (1) Groscost had conferred "huge" benefits upon Alder; (2) Alder 
acknowledged and appreciated the benefits received from Groscost; and, (3) it would be 
unjust for Alder to receive and retain the benefits without paying Groscost for them. (R. 147, 
647-648). 
The trial court, considering all the evidence and the circumstances, determined the 
value of the benefit conferred from Groscost to Alder to be $27,415.00. Then, it reduced that 
amount by an off-set for Alder's successful counter-claim, in the sum of $3,954.92, for a final 
net award to Groscost of $23,460.08. (R. 151-152 and 650-651). 
Alder timely appealed the trial court's decision. (R. 155-155A). On appeal, Alder 
contends that the trial court erred by applying the wrong measure of damages to Groscost's 
claim for unjust enrichment, and, that under the application of the correct measure of 
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damages, Groscost's claim is unsupported by the evidence presented at trial. (Appellants' 
Brief at Page 1.) 
Relevant Statement of Facts 
Robert Alder and Janalyn Groscost, (daughter of Plaintiff-Appellee Groscost) were 
married in February 1991. (R.462). At that time, Janalyn was employed at Farm Credit 
Bank and Alder was self employed as a real estate appraiser. (R. 474). About nine (9) 
months after the couple married, around the end of October or November 1991, they 
considered buying a home. (R. 546-550). Beginning in late October or early November, 
1991, Alder and Janalyn had some discussions with Janalyn's father, James Groscost, about 
Alder and Janalyn's prospects of buying a home. They also discussed the possibility of 
building a new home instead of purchasing an existing one. (R. 546-550, 463-465). 
James Groscost is involved in the construction industry and is a principal shareholder 
and officer in Broken Arrow, Inc., (R. 206-207). During the above mentioned discussions, 
Mr. Groscost suggested that Alder and Janalyn consider building a new home; with his 
expertise, help and contacts, he could help them cut costs. (R. 208-209). Mr. Groscost 
prepared an estimate of costs for a new home for the Alders, having obtained bids from 
several subcontractors. (R. 209). 
There was no expressed agreement between Mr. Groscost and either or both Alder 
and Janalyn concerning the construction project. (R. 590, 647). 
Construction on the Alder's home began in or about June 1992, and continued for 
over twelve (12) months, and was completed in August of 1993. (R. 384-585). 
3 
In May of 1993, there was a falling out between Alder and Janalyn and it was decided 
that they would separate and divorce. (R. 479). At this time the home was still under 
construction. (R. 479). About this same time, Alder and Janalyn met with Mr. Groscost to 
determine what to do with the home. (R. 480-484). Alder, Janalyn and Mr. Groscost had 
several discussions about the house. (R480-484). No agreement was ever reached by the 
parties. (R. 647). 
Mr. Groscost was involved in the construction from its inception to its termination, in 
every facet. (R. 307). Mr. Groscost acted as the general contractor. (R. 482). Much of the 
construction work on the house was done by Mr. Groscost's construction company, Broken 
Arrow. (R. 592-593). Mr. Groscost, himself, spent a lot of time and effort building the 
house. (R. 543). Mr. Groscost was a huge key in the construction of the house. (R. 589). 
And, but for the efforts of Mr. Groscost the house would not have been constructed. (R. 
592-593). Alder contributed very little to the construction. (R. 587-588, 649). 
After construction was completed, the home was eventually sold to a third-party for 
$296,000.00. (R. 523). The proceeds from the sale were $116,000.00. Alder does not believe 
that the $116,000.00 proceeds are "profit". (R. 524). Alder and Janalyn each received 
$58,450.00 from the sale of the house. (R. 649). 
After the house sold, there remained amounts due and owing to Mr. Groscost for the 
construction. (R. 265). Mr. Groscost tried to resolve the remaining issue of amounts due 
and owing to him for the construction with Alder, but Alder would not do anything. (R. 
442). 
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The case was tried to Judge Rigtrup over three (3) non-consecutive days and at the 
end, the trial court concluded as a matter of law from all the evidence that Alder had been 
unjustly enriched. (R. 648). The trial court then stated that the measure of damages for 
unjust enrichment was the value of the benefit conferred, namely the Defendant's gain, not 
the detriment of the Plaintiff or not the value of Plaintiffs services. (R. 648). Accordingly, 
the trial court awarded damages to Groscost of $27,415.00 and reduced that amount by a 
counter-claim offset to net a final award of $23,460.08. (R. 649-651). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Alder's claim that the trial court applied the wrong measure of damages is, simply put, 
not true. The trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law are correct. The trial court 
did not err by applying an improper measure of damages, it applied to correct measure. 
Alder argues that the trial court awarded Alder's profits to Groscost. This is not true. 
The trial court carefully considered all of the evidence, and found: (1) that there was no 
contract between the parties; (2) that Groscost had conferred huge benefits on the Alders; (3) 
that the Alders knew and appreciated the extent of that benefit; and (4) that under the 
circumstances, it would be unjust to allow Alder to retain that benefit conferred without 
paying for it. Query: What was the benefit received and retained by Alder? The benefit 
received came from the sale of the house, namely $58,450.00. Query: What other benefit did 
Alder receive from Groscost besides the direct proceeds from the sale of the house? None 
other. The trial court correctly determined that the benefit conferred, was Defendant's gain. 
The trial court then correctly determined that the value of the benefit was Defendant's gain 
and that a portion of such gain was due and owing from Alder to Groscost. 
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In addition, the evidence adduced at trial is sufficient to support the trial court's 
award. Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that an improper measure of damages was 
utilized by the trial court, the evidence presented supports an award of at least the amount 
awarded at trial. In fact, the evidence presented at trial supports an award in excess of the 
amount awarded at trial. At trial Alder had every opportunity to challenge, object to, or 
contradict Groscost's testimony and evidence, and he failed to do so. As such, the trial court 
determined the facts from the evidence and made its award accordingly. The evidence clearly 
supports the court's award. 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING PLAINTIFF THE 
REASONABLE VALUE OF THE BENEFIT CONFERRED UPON 
DEFENDANT. 
Unjust enrichment is used to characterize the result of a failure to make restitution of 
benefits received under such circumstances as to give rise to a legal or equitable obligation to 
account therefor. 66 Am Jur 2d Restitution And Implied Contracts § 3 at 945. The right of 
recovery under unjust enrichment is essentially equitable, its basis being that in a given 
situation it is contrary to equity and good conscience for one to retain a benefit which has 
come to him at the expense of another. Id. at 946. 
Recovery on the theory of unjust enrichment presupposes that no enforceable contract 
exists. Bailey-Allen Co., v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 1994). 
The measure of recovery for unjust enrichment is the value of the actual benefit 
realized and retained. 66 Am Jur 2d § 3, Supra, at 973. The value of the actual benefit 
realized and retained without an express contract for payment does not depend solely on the 
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time expended or the actual labor bestowed. The peculiar situation of property on which 
work was done, the attendant risk, and other circumstances may be taken into consideration. 
Id. 
In 1987, this Court issued its opinion in Davies v. Olson, 746 P.2d 264 (Utah App. 
1987). Davies involved an action for unjust enrichment where the parties had orally agreed 
that plaintiff would construct four duplexes for defendant. A written contract was proposed 
regarding the cost, but was never signed by the parties. The lower court found an agreement 
between the parties and accordingly awarded plaintiff damages. 
On appeal, this Court found no agreement between the parties and remanded the case 
for a determination of damages to be awarded based on unjust enrichment. Id. 
Due to some confusion regarding the use and application quantum meruit, this Court 
in Davies took the initiative and provided guidance to the lower court and other courts. Id. at 
268 and 269. There this Court stated: 
Contract implied in law, also known as quasi-contract or unjust 
enrichment, is one branch of quantum meruit. A quasi-contract 
is not a contract at all, but rather is a legal action in restitution. 
The elements of a quasi-contract, or a contract implied in law, 
are: (1) the defendant received a benefit; (2) an appreciation or 
knowledge by the defendant of the benefit; (3) under 
circumstances that would make it unjust for the defendant to 
retain the benefit without paying for it. Id. at 269, (citations 
omitted). 
Then immediately following this statement of the law this Court declared: 
The measure of recovery under quasi-contract, or contract 
implied in law, is the value of the benefit conferred on the 
defendant (the defendant's gain) and not the detriment incurred 
by the plaintiff, see First Inv. Co. v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 687 
(Utah 1980) or necessarily the reasonable value of the plaintiffs 
services. Id. (Emphasis added.) 
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Therefore, the measure of recovery is the value of the benefit conferred. The benefit 
conferred is the defendant's gain and not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff. Alder 
argues that the law only allows a court to award the reasonable value of plaintiffs services. 
That is not the correct legal standard. The correct legal standard is the value of the benefit 
conferred, namely, the defendant's gain. It is interesting that Alder's discussion of the Davies 
case fails to include three critically important words, the defendant's gain. The defendant's 
gain specifically describe what is the value of the benefit conferred. Moreover, Davies also 
tells us what is not the value of the benefit conferred. The value of the benefit conferred is 
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff. However, that is precisely what Alder would have 
this Court believe. 
This Court in 1988 reiterated its statement of the law from Davies in Scheller v. Dixie 
Six Corp., 753 P.2d 971, 975 (Utah App. 1988), stating: 
Recovery under quasi-contract or contract implied in law is 
measured by the value of the benefit conferred on the defendant 
and not by the detriment incurred by the plaintiff or, necessarily, 
the reasonable value of the plaintiffs services. Id. (Citing 
Davies). 
The Scheller decision tell us again what is not the value of the benefit conferred. It is 
not the detriment incurred by the plaintiff or the reasonable value of plaintiffs services. It is 
the benefit conferred on the defendant, in other words, the Defendant's gain. 
And, most recently, on May 31, 1994, this Court once again reiterated its statement of 
the law found in Davies, stating: 
The benefit conferred on the defendant, and not the plaintiffs 
detriment or the reasonable value of its services, is the measure 
of recovery. Bailey-Allen, Supra at 425 and 426. (Citing Davies 
and Scheller.) 
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The Bailey-Allen case involved facts somewhat similar to this case. There, plaintiff and 
defendant entered into a contract for the construction of defendant's home. The parties 
signed an agreement, but the agreement was silent regarding remedies in case of breach. 
After the project was approximately 10% complete, defendant terminated plaintiffs services, 
based on plaintiffs failure to provide proof of insurance. Plaintiff sued defendant on several 
theories, including unjust enrichment. 
At trial, the lower court concluded that plaintiff could recover under unjust 
enrichment and awarded plaintiff damages. On appeal, this Court found that the lower court 
findings were not as specific as they should have been and remanded the case for more 
specific findings under the Davies standard. 
The lower court in calculating its award, looked at the percentage of the work 
completed by plaintiff and multiplied that percentage by the total contract price to arrive at 
an amount of what value of benefit plaintiff had conferred on defendant. On appeal, this 
Court found that the method used by the trial court was not unreasonable, stating: 
We also note that the percentage of the work completed, if it 
resulted from Bailey-Allen's efforts, is not an unreasonable 
measure of the benefits conferred. See Darrell J. Didericksen & 
Sons, Inc. v. Magna Water & Sewer, 613 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 
1980) 
The trial court in this case utilized a similar method. It found that Alder had 
contributed up to 15% of the construction, and that the rest had been contributed by 
Groscost. The trial court then awarded Groscost the percentage of his efforts/contribution to 
the construction. The result is that the parties received an amount which directly reflects the 
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percentage of work contributed by each, or in other words, each is allowed to "reap what they 
sow." 
Alder's argument infers that if Groscost is allowed this recovery then Alder will not 
receive anything. Bear in mind that Alder contributed very little to the construction. 
Groscost was a huge key to the construction and, but for Groscost being involved, the house 
would not have been built. Alder and Groscost are entitled to the percentage of their 
contributions and that is what they received. Alder gains approximately $18,000.00 for not 
having done much at all. 
When discussions began between Alder, Janalyn and Mr. Groscost, everyone believed 
and intended that Alder and Janalyn would live in the house. Under that scenario, the 
benefit to be conferred by Groscost would be Alder and Janalyn's new home at a cost to 
them of less than what they could buy it for on the open market. However, when Alder and 
Janalyn separated and intended to divorce and sell the house, and upon the house's eventual 
sale, the benefit conferred by Groscost to Alder was no longer Alder and Janalyn's new home 
at a cost to them of less than what they could have purchased the same house for on the 
open market. It was the benefit received by Alder, which were the proceeds from the sale of 
the home, namely the "defendant's gain". 
Alder contends that the courts do not allow recovery of defendant's gain and seems to 
stretch that argument illogically to mean that the trial court cannot consider, whatsoever, the 
"defendant's gain" in awarding damages. These contentions are in error. 
Moreover, Alder also argues that the trial court's measure of recovery is unworkable 
from a practical standpoint. Alder attempts to illustrate the error in the trial court's theory of 
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damages by posing the following question: What would Groscost have been awarded if the 
house sold at a break-even figure or at a loss figure? Alder answers his question: Groscost 
would not have been entitled to any recovery. This is not true. 
Alder's argument fails to recall the specifics of this case. Recall that this transaction 
was not one in the normal course of business. Alder himself testified that this was "not an 
arm's length transaction," Alder did not view it as such. However, Alder, now on appeal, 
wants to argue that the trial court's theory would not work in an arms length transaction and 
therefore, it should not work here. The trial court, in its wisdom, recognized that this was not 
a normal business transaction and took that into consideration in making its award. The trial 
court's award is the only award contemplated and allowed by law and which makes any sense. 
Alder states that owners assume the risk and therefore, they should realize the profit. 
That is true in a normal business arrangement. This was not a normal business arrangement. 
Query: Who was the owner in this case? From the evidence it appears to be Groscost; he 
practically built the entire house; and he practically financed the entire project. And, now 
Alder wants Groscost to take nothing and he wants to keep everything for himself. That 
result is precisely the type of unjust enrichment the law was meant to prevent and protect 
from. 
As noted previously, many factors may and should be considered when determining 
the value of the benefit conferred. 66 Am Jr. 2d § 3, Supra. The trial court committed no 
error in applying the correct measure of damages and awarding Groscost an amount 
reflecting the value of the benefit he conferred on Alder. 
11 
n. APPLYING THE CORRECT MEASURE OF DAMAGES, GROSCOST 
PRESENTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON ALL ASPECTS OF HIS 
DAMAGES CLAIMS 
Alder argues that the trial court applied the wrong measure of recovery and that 
under the correct measure of recovery, Groscost failed to adduce sufficient evidence in 
support of his claims. As discussed above, it is clear that the trial court did not apply the 
wrong measure of recovery and in fact, did apply the correct measure. Moreover, under any 
measure of recovery for unjust enrichment, Groscost presented sufficient evidence in support 
of his claim. 
A quick visual review of the trial transcript and trial exhibits shows the voluminous 
amounts of testimony and documentary evidence Groscost presented at trial. Moreover, this 
same quick visual review, will reveal the want of any testimony or documentary evidence 
produced by Alder to contradict Groscost's evidence. 
Alder's argument on appeal is nothing more than his closing argument at trial. Alder 
again chooses not to introduce evidence or point to evidence at trial which contradicts 
Groscost's evidence, but rather continues to argue that what Groscost did was not enough. 
Groscost produced and the court admitted, without any objection by Alder, 
voluminous documentary evidence in support of his claims; Alder produced very little, if any. 
Groscost called four (4) individual witnesses to testify on his behalf. Alder called one (1), 
himself. Alder had every opportunity to challenge or object to Groscost's evidence at trial, 
but he failed to do so. Alder had every opportunity to present documentary evidence to 
contradict Groscost's evidences, but he did not. Alder had every opportunity to introduce 
testimony to contradict Groscost's but again he chose not to. Just because Alder did not take 
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advantage of his opportunity to try his case, he cannot now come to this court and argue that 
Groscost failed to prove his case. 
The evidence introduced at trial clearly supports Groscost's claim. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellee James Groscost respectfully requests that this Court 
affirm the trial court's judgment/award on the basis that the trial court applied the correct 
measure of damages, in awarding Plaintiff the value of the benefit conferred upon Defendant. 
And, the testimony and voluminous documentary evidence sufficiently supports the trial 
court's award. 
DATED this / V ^ d a y of September, 1995. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
Richard R. Neslen 
Thomas D. Walk 
Attorneys for Appellee James Groscost 
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